An Analysis on the Sustainability of a Monetary Union under External Shocks and Its Implications for the Gulf Countries by Farvaque Etienne et al.
??An Analysis on the Sustainability
of a Monetary Union under External
Shocks and Its Implications
for the Gulf Countries
Etienne Farvaque¤ ?
Norimichi Matsueda¤¤ ?
External shocks, be they political or economic, can pose a signi¯cant
threat to the sustainability of a monetary union. This paper focuses on
the openness of a monetary union, and examines how the degrees and
characteristics of the sensitivities of its member nations towards external
shocks a®ect the sustainability of their commitment when joining the
union. Furthermore, we discuss the sustainability of the prospective
monetary union among the Gulf Cooperation Council countries in the
light of the obtained insights.
Etienne Farvaque, Norimichi Matsueda
?? JEL?E58, E61, F33
Keywords?Monetary Union, Optimum Currency Areas, External Shocks,
Gulf Cooperation Council
1 Introduction
Since the implementation of the European Monetary Union (EMU),
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2005, and Chey, 2009), especially where monetary uni¯cation projects
have been reassessed and sometimes relaunched historically. The Middle
East region is among these areas, notably within the members of the
Gulf Cooperation Council: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia
and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Although the prospect of a
monetary union among these countries has recently stagnated (with
some countries even disengaging from the convergence plans), o±cial
statements by its prospective members still suggest that the deadline
of 2010 should not be pushed too far away. Following the work of
Zaidi (1990), the project has also attracted academic attention, and
the approaching o±cial deadline has triggered renewed interests with
broadly optimistic assessments (see the recent evaluations by Abu-Bader
and Abu-Qarn, 2008, Buiter, 2008a, Furceri and Karras, 2008, and
Pattanaik, 2007, for instance).
However, most of the studies look at this project from the viewpoint
of the traditional literature on Optimum Currency Areas (OCA) and
focuses on ex-ante criteria for belonging to a successful monetary union.
Although ex-post criteria have attracted increasing attention recently,
internal shocks (and the ensuing divergence processes) still lie at the core
of their reasoning. Since the seminal contributions of Mundell (1961),
McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969), the literature weighs the bene¯ts
of having a common currency against the costs of losing monetary
autonomy. As long as the bene¯ts of possessing a single currency arise
solely from a reduction in transaction costs for internal transactions,
the bene¯ts are certainly greater when member countries trade more
intensively within a union. On the other hand, the costs are mainly
due to asymmetric shocks, i.e., shocks which induce divergence in the
economic growth of the member countries. Therefore, the optimality of
monetary unions fundamentally depends on the asymmetry of shocks,
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which in turn is related to the degree of synchronization of shocks among
the prospective members of a monetary union. As Santos Silva and
Tenreyro (2010) state, the asymmetry of shocks has become a catch-all
concept to capture the impacts of all types of shocks (supply and
demand) as well as the structure of the economy, which \in turn may
a®ect the nature and speed of adjustment of the economy to shocks (p.
26)." Hence, the OCA criteria generally look at factors inside a newly
formed monetary union in investigating what could or would happen
after the introduction of a new currency. It is true that the more recent
literature, notably following the line of Frankel and Rose's (1997, 1998)
argument, has stated that countries which would not form an optimum
currency area ex ante could evolve towards such a reference point by
reducing the asymmetry of real output movements. Such an ex post
evolution would originate from the reorganization and rationalization of
production activities inside the union.
However, such a perspective overlooks an important aspect of monetary
unions. As Bordo and James (2008) argue by looking at the historical
evidence, multinational monetary unions can be fragile, or strongly
weakened by external common shocks (in particular, they study the
impact of World War I, and the ensuing business cycle divergence
it has induced). Assessing the viability of a multinational monetary
union against common external shocks may prove crucial, as proved
by the demise of some well-known monetary unions, such as the Latin
Monetary Union, the Scandinavian one, and, more recently, the one
of Czechoslovakia. As we discuss below, this feature is particularly
important in the case of the GCC countries. While it is true that some
authors, e.g., Nitsch (2005) and Rose (2007), emphasize in°ationary
shocks as the most important determinant for the dissolution of monetary
unions, their arguments do not contradict the possibilities that the gap
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in in°ation rates between monetary union members may be induced by
external shocks and the following member economies' reactions to such
shocks.
In other words, the traditional argument of the OCA theory is that a
prospective monetary union will not be sustainable under the following
two conditions: Either its members face asymmetric (or asynchronous)
shocks and/or they respond asymmetrically to uniform shocks (a di®erence
in reactions which itself may be due to their di®erent economic structures
since varying degrees of price and wage °exibility, for example, induce
asynchronous shocks). However, the empirical studies that look at
the optimality of a monetary union have not explicitly distinguished
whether such shocks originate from within the monetary union or from
its outside. Prominent examples include Alesina et al. (2002) and Barro
and Tenreyro (2007) which study the impact of currency unions on the
pattern of covariance of shocks, but do not distinguish shocks according
to their origins (external or internal) and simply consider the impact
of all the shocks (whatever their natures are) on a union's member
macroeconomic indicators. For the GCC countries, such an argument
is especially valid, as it has been shown that symmetric shocks in
the region, be they real or nominal, are associated with signi¯cantly
di®erent variances (Razzak, 2009). This result is re¯ned in the study by
Rosmy et al. (2010), which distinguishes between demand and supply
shocks, di®erentiates their oil and non-oil parts, and shows that the sole
symmetric shocks for these countries are actually the oil-demand shocks.
However, the origins of the shocks considered are not mentioned there.
In sum, the literature deals with the consequences of the shocks, but
di®erentiating the impact of the origins of the shocks is still an open
question and has not received much considerations in the literature.
Besides the existing criteria for a currency area, therefore, we consider
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in this paper how a multinational monetary union can resist to the
shocks coming from the rest of the world. In other words, we are
interested in the conditions under which a monetary union can survive
external shocks. In order to analyze the consequences of external shocks
on a multinational monetary union, we ¯rst build a simple model of a
monetary union, focusing on the divergent characteristics of members
when they have di®erent degrees of sensitivities to external shocks.
We then demonstrate the relevance of our argument by looking at one
of the most striking examples of monetary union projects that could be
threatened by external shocks, i.e., the one currently contemplated by
the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council. While being a prominent
example of on-going Arab economic integration (Hoekman and Sekkat,
2010), its feasibility has not been examined from the speci¯c perspective
we adopt here. Unfortunately, our assessment of the sustainability of this
monetary union project is not quite optimistic unless strong deepening
of political integration happens prior to (or, at least, in parallel with)
monetary uni¯cation, and the new central bank receives large amount of
o±cial reserves from its founding members. This emphasis on political
commitment is detailed in a book by Rutledge (2009), which stresses
the lack of institutional preparation for the planned monetary union as
an impediment for its establishment.1)
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model upon
which our argument rests. The following section establishes the features
of the monetary union when the sensitivities of its members to external
shocks di®ers. Section 4 applies the model's insights to the GCC case
and provides some comparisons with the European experience. Section
5 concludes the paper.
1) Chey (2009) has a similar focus on political-economy issues in discussing
possible monetary unions in East Asia.
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2 The model
Our model basically consists of a description of the economic structure of
a monetary union and a speci¯cation of policy-making bodies' preferences.
In this section, we ¯rst describe the situation under autonomy and
compute each policy-maker's optimal interest rate as a function of each
country's characteristics.
2.1 Economy
The framework we use is based on the literature on discretion and
time-consistency (see for example Walsh, 2010, chapter 7, and Alesina
and Barro, 2002). For the simplicity of exposition, we assume that
the union consists of 2 economies, indexed by j = 1; 2: The aggregate
demand of an economy j is described by the following equation:
ydj;t = ¡® (it ¡ ¼j;t) ; (1)
where ydj;t; it; and ¼j;t are respectively the aggregate demand, the nominal
interest rate and the in°ation rate of this economy at time t, whereas
® is a positive parameter:
On the other hand, each economy's aggregate supply is given by a
Lucas-type supply function where unexpected in°ation boosts its output:
ysj;t = ¯ (¼j;t ¡ ¼et ) + !jÀt; (2)
where ysj;t and ¼
e
t are the aggregate supply and the expected in°ation
rate, while Àt represents period t's supply shock, originating from the
rest of the world, and !j is a positive parameter and signi¯es country
j's sensitivity to this shock.2) Also, ¯ is a parameter with a positive
2) We do not consider national (or regional, or sectorial) shocks as well as any
demand shocks. Incorporating them would make the algebra more tedious,
without additional implications of great signi¯cance. Moreover, focusing on
the external supply shock reinforces the link between our setup and historical
evidences on some monetary unions demises, principally triggered by a price
variation in an oversea commodity market among others.
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value. In equilibrium, we have
¼j;t =
1
¯ ¡ ® (¡®it + ¯¼
e
t ¡ !jÀt) ; (3a)
yj;t =
¯
¯ ¡ ®

¡®it + ®¼et ¡ ®
¯
!jÀt

: (3b)
Here, we suppose ® < ¯ so as to rule out an unrealistic behavior of
in°ation. The two local economies di®er from each other only with
respect to their individual sensitivities to the rest-of-the-world shock.
We suppose that the shock is normally distributed with a well-de¯ned
variance and a zero mean.
2.2 Policy-makers
In our model of a monetary union, monetary policy is decided by a
federal college, consisting of country representatives. We also refer to
them as \governors." In order to focus on the impact of shocks, we
discard di®erences over their preferences and suppose that representatives
agree on the objectives to be followed. Namely, they all target the
same in°ation rate and the same output level.
Accordingly, the objective of each representative central banker, i.e.,
governor, is to minimize the following loss function:
Gj;t =
1
2
(¼j;t ¡ ¼¤)2 + ¸
2
(yj;t ¡ y¤)2 ; (4)
where we assume that the desired in°ation rate and output level (¼¤
and y¤) are identical across all the governors.3) Moreover, we suppose
exactly the same preference for the monetary delegates (identical ¸), for
the sake of simplicity. The assumption of a common in°ation objective
across the union does not seem too unrealistic for countries sharing (or
3) Alternatively, y¤ can be considered as the di®erence between the desired and
the natural output growth rates. Here, this would simply mean that, while
economies may have di®erent natural output growth rates, the policy-makers
try to minimize the gap between the actual and the optimal growth rates.
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considering to share) the same currency. Furthermore, we normalize
these desired values as ¼¤ = y¤ = 0.4)
To complete the model, the timing of policy-making decisions needs to
be speci¯ed. Here, we consider that private agents form their expectations
¯rst, and the value of the shock is subsequently revealed. Then, the
monetary authority sets its policy rate. Finally, transactions take place,
which determines the actual levels of output and in°ation.5)
2.3 Optimal policy under autonomy
We start by deriving our benchmark case, i.e., what happens if a
country lives outside the monetary union? Even such an autonomous
case is not equivalent to autarky and the country is not immune from
rest-of-the-world shocks. Moreover, it may su®er from even larger shocks
than when it is a member of the monetary union since the relative size
of the outside world increases when staying out. In order to simplify
the discussion here and not to bias the results in any speci¯c way, we
assume that the sensitivity to external shocks under autonomy is the
same as when being inside the monetary union.
To determine each policy-maker's optimal interest rate, it su±ces
to notice that the model is fully symmetric around zero. Therefore,
the expected in°ation rate can only be equal to zero. For each local
economy, the preferred policy is therefore obtained by minimizing her
loss function over ij;t, while assuming that the expected in°ation rate is
equal to zero. This is the interest rate that that governor would choose
to implement if monetary policy was independently decided. Inserting
4) Note that, as we are interested solely in computing the parameter conditions
for a monetary union to be sustainable, this simpli¯cation about structurally
deterministic components is inocuous while it simpli¯es the algebra signi¯cantly.
5) The model here is a static one and we do not consider reputation gains
which could accrue from the monetary uni¯cation.
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this interest rate in equations (3a) and (3b), one obtains
¼Aj;t = ¡ ¸¯
1 + ¸¯2
!jÀt; (5a)
yAj;t =
1
1 + ¸¯2
!jÀt; (5b)
where the subscript A signi¯es \autonomy."
It is obvious from (5a) and (5b) that an external shock a®ects di®erent
countries di®erently, depending on the degrees of sensitivity, !j . Hence,
even though we assume that the countries have identical preferences
and objectives, monetary policy would need to be tailored to their
individual needs, due to the di®erentiated impacts of external shocks,
which are perceived asymmetrically between the respective member
states. An example of the situation we have in mind is the e®ects of
an oil shock, which would be symmetric at origin but felt di®erently
across nations, depending on a country's import dependence, industrial
structures, climate patterns, and so on.6)
Even though a signi¯cant bene¯t of joining a monetary union stems
from the commitment of the newly founded central bank to ¯ght in°ation,
such a bene¯t depends on the new central bank's ability to adhere
to adopting the currency of the third country as an anchor or to a
monetary rule that guarantees the reduction of the in°ationary bias. In
(5a) and (5b), the existence of an idiosyncratic part of the common
external shocks implies that each member economy of a union could
su®er from joining a common monetary policy. Such an ambivalence is
now commonly recognized in the debates on the sustainability conditions
for monetary unions (see Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2010, for example).
6) Note that our theoretical result conforms with the ¯ndings in Nitsch (2005).
Although he considers in°ation di®erentials as the main culprit for the
dissolution of monetary unions (and dismisses the role of openness), he does
not investigate the impact of external shocks on in°ation dynamics.
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We adress this issue in the next section.
3 Life in a monetary union
3.1 Policy of the union's central bank
In a monetary union, the decisions over the interest rate are made
by a monetary policy body that is interested in the union's welfare as
a whole, rather than the situation of any single country in particular.
Such a body's preference is described by the following loss function:
Gft =
1
2

¼ft ¡ ¼¤
2
+
¸
2

yft ¡ y¤
2
; (6)
where ¼ft and y
f
t are respectively the weighted averages of the member
countries' in°ation rates and output levels,7) and the superscript f
indicates the case where the interest rate is chosen by a (federal)
policy-maker with a union-wide objective. In the two-country situation,
we can write these as
¼ft = ½¼1;t + (1¡ ½)¼2;t; (7a)
yft = ½y1;t + (1¡ ½) y2;t; (7b)
where ½ (½ 2 [0; 1]) is the relative weight assigned to country 1.
Invoking the assumptions of ¼¤ = y¤ = 0, the minimization of this
loss function under the constraints of the expressions in (7a) and (7b),
which give the union's in°ation rate and output level, leads to the
following optimal interest rate:
ift = ¡
1 + ¸®¯
® (1 + ¸¯2)
(½!1 + (1¡ ½)!2) Àt: (8)
Hence, the union's monetary policy reacts to the external shocks by
considering its members' idiosyncrasies and weighting them accordingly.
By plugging this interest rate into the expression of each country's
7) This assumption is relatively standard in the literature as a union's objective.
For di®erent formulations, see Aaron-Cureau and Kempf (2006) for example.
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in°ation rate and output level, we obtain:
¼ft = ¡ (½!1 + (1¡ ½)!2)
®¸¯
(1 + ¸¯2)
Àt; (9a)
yft = (½!1 + (1¡ ½)!2)
®
1 + ¸¯2
Àt: (9b)
These equations indicate that, even in a highly stylized model, external
shocks cannot be disregarded since they impact the determination of
the optimal single monetary policy. Moreover, depending on the relative
size of the countries, ½; and the sensitivity to external shocks, !, the
optimal union-wide monetary policy di®ers from the optimal policy under
autonomy. Quite intuitively, the gap between these two optimal policies
(autonomous and centralized) is all the more signi¯cant if countries are
of di®erent sizes and if external shocks are probable. The likelihood of
external shocks could be expected to be even higher if the monetary
union newly-founded central bank adopts the currency of the third
country as an external anchor. We now turn to the impact of such an
anchoring policy on our results.
3.2 The e®ects of exchange rate anchoring
Suppose that the new central bank adopts the currency of an external
anchor, the role of the exchange rate of the union vis-a-vis the anchor
currency has to be incorporated in the model. As in von Hagen (1992),
or Kohler (2002), the inclusion of the exchange rate between the external
anchor and the new currency area leads to a modi¯cation in the model's
basic equations. Speci¯cally, the equation that represents the dynamics
of the exchange rate needs to be added to the aggregate demand and
supply equations.
The exchange rate equation for the union with a third-country currency
can be described by the following equation:
eft = Ã

¼ft ¡ ¼at

: (10)
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where e is the real exchange rate, a subscript a indicates the anchor
country, and Ã is a positive parameter:
Reordering this equation gives an expression for the evolution of the
union's in°ation rate, ¼ft , as a function of the exchange rate and of
the anchor currency's in°ation rate (and, de facto, monetary policy).
Here, we need to consider two di®erent cases. Firstly, if the new central
bank decides to ¯x the exchange rate or to adopt an anchoring policy,
it will experience pressures each time the anchor country's monetary
policy is modi¯ed. In such a case, the thrust of our argument would
only be strengthened since the union's monetary policy becomes more
closely linked to external considerations (and not only to external shocks
hitting each member economy). In other words, the pass-through from
the rest-of-the-world to the union will be reinforced. Secondly, it could
be the case where the central bank chooses to have a °oating, or
°exible, exchange rate. Indeed, this is the situation we have implicitly
supposed in the previous subsection where the union's monetary policy is
determined solely by considering the members' economies. In this case,
the exchange rate movements hit each economy as an external shock,
whose magnitude is given by each economy's sensitivity to exchange
rate °uctuations. Therefore, explicitly incorporating the exchange rate
relations between the monetary union and the rest of the world into
the model does not lead to a qualitatively di®erent result than the one
obtained above.8)
Whereas the model above is highly stylized and can only be considered
as an illustrative one, we believe that, in the light of the analytical
observations it produces, the sustainability of monetary unions should
8) Although this is out of the scope of the current paper, a more complete
modeling would induce quantitative changes as is shown in Ball (1999), for
example.
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also be considered from the perspective of the occurrence of external
shocks (Farvaque and Matsueda, 2009). The next section discusses the
prospective project in the Gulf region from this particular viewpoint.
4 The Gulf Cooperation Council monetary union
4.1 Prospect and assessment
The member countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), i.e.,
Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab
Emirates (UAE), may seem very similar at ¯rst sight. They all depend
heavily on oil both in their outputs and in their exports. Moreover,
they share a number of geographical borders, a common language, and
high average living standards, which are attributable to the remarkable
economic growth rates since the 1970s, being on average above 2% p.a.
(an exception is Kuwait, where its growth rate has been barely positive
on average with a high volatility mainly due to its war years). While
not all of them are under the threat of depleting their oil reserves, they
are all facing rapid population growth which is now creating a need for
even higher economic growth rates.9) Diversi¯cation of their production
is also pressing, given the fact that the public sector still provides a
large part of employment to the indigenous part of the labor force.
Such similarities have probably contributed to stronger political
relations and created the impetus to policy coordination. E®orts have
been made along several dimensions, with trade being perceived as an
engine of growth, even though the negotiations related to a free trade
agreement between the GCC countries and the European Union have
9) Since a substantial part of the population growth is related to imported foreign
labor, it can be controlled relatively easily through hardened immigration
procedures and visa requirements. Razzak (2009) also underlines this point.
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ups-and-downs,10) revealing both the will and the impediments towards
a regional free trade area.
The integration process among the GCC countries o±cially started
in 1981, with the rati¯cation of the Charter of the GCC. From the
start, monetary uni¯cation was considered as an ultimate goal of the
process. In 2001, the common currency, the Khaleeji, was agreed to
be established no later than 2010.11) In between, a customs union was
to operate from 2003, with a single market to be achieved by 2008.
Whereas the o±cial adoption of EU-style convergence criteria in 2005
showed some success for public debt and de¯cit, currency reserves, and
interest rates, several clouds have recently accumulated over the GCC's
horizon.
First, in°ation rates have not yet converged among these countries
although in°ation is one of the convergence criteria and is generally
considered as a pre-condition for monetary uni¯cation. Second, and as
a related issue, while all the GCC countries had pegged their national
currency to the U.S. dollar, both Kuwait and the UAE announced that
they would shift to currency baskets, as their international position was
threatened by the depreciation of the U.S. dollar.12) Although the UAE
¯nally reversed its position in favor of a dollar peg, such hesitations
can also be interpreted as an indication that the future common central
bank may have to manage a basket anchor, or even a °oating currency.
These pronouncements came after the announcement by Oman in 2006
10) This trade agreement is currently suspended for a long while and presented
as to be concluded as soon as possible. See the 20th EU-GCC Joint Council
and Ministerial Meeting (June 2010) communiqu¶e which is available at the
following URL: http://eeas.europa.eu/gulf cooperation/index en.htm.
11) See its o±cial website: http://www.gcc-sg.org.
12) On the importance of the dollar peg for the region and its relevance to the
monetary union, see Abed et al. (2003) and Rosmy et al. (2010).
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that it is ready to join in 2010 and would let the ¯ve others go ahead
with the integration process. Third, it has to be recognized that a single
market with free circulation of goods, services, labor and capital is still
far away. Fourth, the UAE have decided to withdraw their support for
the project, following the Saudis proclamation that they intended to
host the future common central bank, to be located in Riyadh and now
referred to as the Gulf Central Bank while con¯rmed by the remaining
members as well.
Zaidi (1990) is among the ¯rst to have assessed the GCC monetary
projects. At the time of his writing, while in°ation rates were converging
among the member states, there were worries concerning the divergence
in economic structures, which induces a rather skeptical conclusion that
the whole evidence calls for increased coordination among the member
countries. Other studies have applied the Optimal Currency Areas
criteria to the GCC countries. These include Laabas and Limam (2002),
who conclude that, whereas the criteria are not met on an ex-ante
basis, ex-post movements would ensure the viability of the projected
monetary union, Jadresic (2002), who delivers a set of recommendations
to ensure that the bene¯ts of monetary uni¯cation exceed the costs,
and Fasano and Schaechter (2003) and Sturm and Siegfried (2005), who
are less critical although they condition their assessments on improved
structural policies.
More recent evaluations based on the OCA criteria include the studies
by Pattanaik (2007), Abu-Bader and Abu-Qarn (2008), Buiter (2008a)
and Furceri and Karras (2008).13) While the ¯ndings from the ¯rst
two studies generally indicate that the criteria are not met for the
13) Furceri and Karras (2008) consider 13 countries from the Middle East,
encompassing the Gulf Cooperation Council members, and adding Egypt, Iran,
Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Syria and Yemen to the list of countries.
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GCC to form a monetary union, Buiter (2008a) and Furceri and Karras
(2008) are more a±rmative. Buiter (2008) considers a monetary union
to be the only game in town for those countries, stating that \even
a suboptimal monetary union will be better than continued monetary
autarky (Buiter, 2008b, p. 21)." Furceri and Karras (2008) cautiously
state that the estimated costs and bene¯ts of a monetary union strongly
vary from one country to another, but still emphasize the favorable
e®ects of strong convergence in business-cycle synchronization as well
as in°ation rates among most of the GCC members.
On the other hand, Darrat and Al Shamsi (2005) are more optimistic,
as their cointegration test results show that the GCC members'
macroeconomic variables (namely, GDP, in°ation, exchange rate, money
stock and money base) are linked in the long-run. Hence, they insist
that the uni¯cation process is not impeded by economic divergences,
but by (missing) political willpower. Hebous (2006) is even more upbeat
through looking at the European-style convergence criteria and stressing
upon the general similarities among the member states of the GCC.
In the light of our theoretical model above where exposure to rest
of the world shocks is fundamental in assessing the sustainability of
the GCC's prospect as a monetary union, it has to be noted, ¯rst of
all, that the GCC nations do exhibit high degrees of openness. Data
from the Penn World Tables 6.3 (Heston et al., 2009) show that, for
two of the countries, openness ratios are close to 100% (Oman and
Qatar), while that ¯gure is above 100% for three of them (see Table
1, keeping in mind that Bahrain's ¯gure is probably overestimated, due
to its position as a regional transhipment pole).
However, such an openness does not translate into high trade relations
inside the region: exports to the other GCC members from a member
state average merely 5.25% of total exports, a ¯gure that is in stark
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Table 1. Gulf Cooperation Council Members Compared
with the European Monetary Union
Openness 
ratio (%) 
GDP 
elasticity 
w.r.t. 
openness 
Gulf Cooperation 
Council 
Bahrain 158.89 0.32 
Kuwait 101.55 9.49 
Oman 89.23 0.08 
Qatar 90.75 0.43 
Saudi Arabia 71.38 0.55 
United Arab 
Emirates 
140.23 0.15 
Average 108.67 1.84 
Standard dev. 33.64 3.75 
European 
Monetary Union 
Average 80.91 0.19 
Standard dev. 39.11 0.34 
Source: authors' computations, 1990-2007 averages. 
For consistency, EMU excludes Cyprus, Luxembourg, 
Malta, Slovakia and Slovenia. Data from Penn World 
Tables 6.3 (Heston et al., 2009). 
contrast with the situation in the European Union, where intra-EU trade
represents between 50 and 80% of the member countries' total trade.14)
The prospects look even worse given the recent estimates by Boughanmi
(2008), which show that those already low ¯gures may be even higher
than what one could expect in view of the traditional determinants of
a gravity trade equation.
In the light of our model, these two facts combined would form
a bad omen for a successful monetary union.15) If one adds to this
14) This problem has been pinpointed by Dar and Presley (2001) as well. Laabas
and Limam (2002) also regard the limited intra-regional trade as an impediment
to a monetary union in this region.
15) Of course, one would prefer to base the diagnosis on the shocks identi¯ed
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picture our estimates of elasticities of those economies' rates of growth
to rest-of-the-world relations (proxied by their openness ratios), the
assessment turns even more pessimistic (see Table 1). It is apparent
from our computations that most of the GCC countries' growth rates
are strongly related to their openness ratios, the average elasticity being
close to 2, with a standard deviation of 3.75.16) These values are largely
superior to the comparable ones for the Euro area (see Table 1). Hence,
any external shock could have a signi¯cant impact on the prospective
members of the GCC monetary union.
According to the argument by Frankel and Rose (1997, 1998), monetary
unions may be more resilient to shocks ex post than ex ante. However,
this argument has been used mostly for internal adjustments needs,
i.e., to explain how the members of a monetary union could cope
with diverging business cycles within their member states while we are
concerned here about the in°uence of external shocks.
As far as external shocks are concerned, exchange rate management
could be an important tool to dampen or counter the impacts on the
constituting economies. Such management is all the more signi¯cant as
the GCC countries have clearly expressed the possibility for the future
monetary authority to °oat the currency.17) This consideration directly
through a VAR or SVAR model. However, it should be noted that (1)
estimating shocks can be tricky for econometricians in countries whose main
export has volatile prices as in our sample and, (2) these countries mostly have
had symmetrical (if not identical) responses to shocks, given their relation to
the U.S. dollar. See Rosmy et al. (2010) for an evaluation along such lines.
16) Abed et al. (2003) compute the elasticity of the region's trade balance to
world GDP variations for the period of 1970-2003. They ¯nd the elasticity
to be 9.21.
17) See its o±cial statement: http://www.gccsg.org/eng/index.php?action=Sec-
Show&ID=58. Habib and Strasky (2008) show that a dollar peg is not
necessarily optimal for oil exporting countries, and Rosmy et al. (2010) also
argue that the dollar is only relevant to cope with certain types of shocks.
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suggests the need for the union's central bank to have a su±cient
amount of foreign reserve to be able to cope with external shocks, by
adjusting the value of the common currency's exchange rate as a way to
smooth the adjustment of the union's economies to external in°uences.
Although many central banks, even among the principal ones, do not
have a strong balance sheet, not to mention external reserves (see
Buiter, 2008b), the GCC countries could probably have a comparative
advantage on this respect. Their external assets are signi¯cantly large.
However, they are mainly located for the moment in the governments'
treasuries or sovereign funds.
Hence, if the GCC countries are to proceed towards a full-°edged
monetary union, one of the most important step they may have to
take is to agree on the size and composition of their common central
bank's balance sheet. Although this issue might appear technical, such
a move would show a strong political commitment and may prove to
be the key to the sustainability of their monetary union.
4.2 Insights from Europe
For the sake of comparison, the European Monetary Union (EMU)
is a nice benchmark. Let us ¯rst recall that, since the implementation
of the monetary union in Europe, several countries of the union,
and occasionally the union itself, have been hit by shocks originating
either from the United States, or from some commodity or ¯nancial
markets. The impacts of these external shocks sometimes became so
signi¯cant upon the Euro area members' economies that they created
some tensions inside the monetary union, to the extent that certain
Italian politicians even reconsidered the bene¯ts of remaining inside the
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union and threatened to exit unilaterally, for instance.18) Although
such a political remark could have been directed towards the Italian
electorate without substantial implications, the scenario has also been
explored by Tilford (2006), under a 40 % probability of occurrence.
Moreover, Nitsch (2005), Rose (2007) and Bordo and James (2008) o®er
the historical relevance of splitting scenarios.
Notwithstanding, Favero and Giavazzi (2008) concretely show that
the levels of long-term rates in Europe are almost entirely explained
by shocks originating from the U.S. Their results notably suggest that
U.S. variables are more important than local variables in the policy
rules followed by the European monetary authorities. In other words,
the European monetary union would be no exception in that external
shocks may put its members' economies under considerable stress.
It should be noted that we are not considering the asymmetric
characters of internal shocks a®ecting the members of the union. What
we consider here are the di®erences in their reactions when external
shocks hit the whole union, and when they do so with di®ering intensities.
The sources of such di®ering intensities can be numerous and have been
listed, e.g. by Dornbusch et al. (1998). A prominent source in our
context is the pass-through of an exchange rate variation of a common
currency compared to currencies of the rest of the world. And, if
the member countries are a®ected di®erently in this regard, prices can
18) Although the exit possibility was ruled out by the Maastricht Treaty, it had
been introduced in the draft Treaty for the European Constitution. The
draft has been rejected on many grounds other than this one and it has
been reformulated as the Lisbon Treaty, which still maintains a unilateral
withdrawal possibility under its article 49A. This issue resurfaced during the
Greek crisis of 2010, but it occurred the other way round in this particular
case, as some politicians in \virtuous" countries questioned the presence of
Greece in the union.
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evolve di®erently inside the union, calling into question the e±ciency
of its single monetary policy, and the viability of the union. Di®erent
price-setting behaviors can be traced back to the specializations of
its member countries, with countries which produce more \up-market"
goods being more capable of leaving their export prices una®ected and,
accordingly, of smoothing external shocks. Based on this argument,
Drissi (2008) obtains estimates that show a one-to-four di®erence between
Germany and the Netherlands in the respective reactions of their price
levels to real exchange rates variations.
Thus, strong disparities in the exposures to external shocks cannot be
easily dismissed even inside the European monetary union, which has
underwent the integration process of sixty years. Therefore, the in°uences
of such disparities upon the viability of a multinational monetary union
need to be accounted for. From a normative point of view, Arnold
(2006) shows that, under such circumstances, the European Central
Bank should be concerned more about the evolutions of countries that do
not have strong trading ties with non-eurozone countries, and also more
about the bigger countries (as small countries are relatively more open
and trade more outside the euro area, thus bene¯ting from an automatic
stabilizing instrument in the form of real exchange rate adjustment).
The empirical evidence by Sturm and WollmershÄauser (2008) suggests
that this has not been the case so far, as developments in the smaller
countries seem to have received more than proportional weights in
the ECB's decision-making. Such a disproportional attention would be
worrying if it is sustained for a prolonged period.19)
19) Indeed, this discrepancy could be expected from a theoretical point of view
since smaller countries accept to enter a monetary union only if their weight
is larger than their size (Casella 1992a and Casella 1992b).
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5 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we show that the sustainability of a monetary union
not only depends on the reorganization and rationalization of production
activities inside the union (i.e., internal shocks), but also on the impact
of external shocks. Unfortunately, the literature has mostly disregarded
this rest-of-the-world feature. We have given a theoretical foundation
to Bordo and James's (2008) historical argument that external shocks
can impair a union's viability.
As one of the most striking real-world examples of a monetary union
project that could be threatened by external shocks, we deliver a
relatively pessimistic assessment of the sustainability of the prospective
monetary union project conceived among the Gulf Cooperation Council
nations. However, if the members countries' political commitments are
su±ciently ¯rm, and if they transfer large amounts of their o±cial
reserves to their future common central bank, the project might be
regarded as more favorable.
The problem we highlight here may also concern other potential
common currency projects. In the Asian region, for example, the
prospect of a monetary union among the ASEAN members also seems
plagued by the in°uence of shocks from the rest of the world. Among
others, the recent estimates by Qin and Tan (2008) show that a large
part of the variance in economic conditions within the region come
from what they call \world factors." This illustrates the need to pay
attention not just to internal aspects but also external conditions in
considering future monetary union projects.
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